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WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
Statutes for the admission of evidence of persons deceased or
insane might be extended by analogy to the business entries rule
to the admission of all evidence of persons actually unavailable
in court. ' It is thought, however, that there is greater reason
for, and would be less opposition to the admission of the evidence
of only those dead or insane.' Consequently the adoption of the
following uniform statute is urged:
"A declaration, whether written or oral, of a deceased or
insane person shall not be excluded from evidence as hearsay
if the court finds that it was made and that it was made in
good faith before the commencement of the action and upon
the personal knowledge of the declarant. ' '
The adoption of these proposals would make available much
relevant evidence; but it would give no advantage to any group
or interest - it would merely permit the jury to know that which
it must now only surmise. These provisions have been found
workable in other states. May West Virginia gain the same ad-
vantages.
-TRXY M. PETERS.
SHOULD COMIVIENT BY THE TRIAL JUDGE BE
AUTHORIZED IN WEST VIRGINIA?
Whatever else familiarity may breed, with lawyers it has
bred opposition to all change in the customs and practices of their
profession. But some (and perhaps often, much) opposition to
change is inevitable in a profession founded on tradition. Thus
the return of the common law power of judicial comment has been
long delayed. Only a few leading lawyers' and jurists have spon-
sored its return.
2
0THE LAw or EVIDENCE, supra n. 16, at 49.
aSo long as a witness is competent and living there is at least a possi-
bility of getting a deposition.2 TnE LAw oF EVIDENCE, .supra n. 16.
"Judge Ritz, in speaking of judicial comment said, "I think it is true
in this state, that we have a system that does not allow our judges in the
state courts to intelligently try a case," (1928) PRoc. W. VA. BA ASS'N
70. Judge McOlintic, at the same meeting said that in 1921 when he was
a member of the legislature, he introduced a bill permitting the circuit
judge to comment if'both parties agreed. Of the twenty-three lawyers in
the House of Delegafes, twenty-one opposed the bill. Three circuit judges
lobbied against it because, as they stated, it would make them pay too close
attention during the trial, (1928) PROc. W. VA. BAR Ass'N 162.
"'The . .. . rule (which obtains by Constitution or statute in almost
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Judicial comment was a part of the jury system at common
law.' It still exists in the English courts,' in several states,' and,
in spite of criticism,' in the federal system.'. It has never been
satisfactorily explained why the majority of states have deprived
judges of this power.8 Like Virginia,' West Virginia, has ex-
pressly denied the trial judge the privilege of comment."0
The dangers inhering in the common law system are alleged
to be: the injustice of autocratic power, the destruction of lay
experience which a judge is said not to possess, undue judicial in-
fluence upon the verdict, and excessive power in a politically
elected judiciary. But the trial judge was not intended to be an
every State, but not in the Federal Courts) is an unfortunate departure
from the orthodox common law rule. It has done more than any other one
thing to impair the general efficiency of jury trial as an instrument of
justice." 5 WIGMORE, EVENCE (2d ed. 1928) § 2551.
"It is not too much to say of any period, in all English History, that it
is impossible to conceive of trial by jury as existing there in a form which
would withhold from the jury the assistance of the court in dealing with
facts." THAYEit, PRELImINARY TREATISE oN EVIDENCE (1898) 188, note.
8 Vicksburg & Elec. By. Co. v. Putnam, 118 U. S. 545, 7 S. Ct. 1 (1886).
'Darby v. Ousley, 1 H. & W. 1, 156 Eng. Rep. 1093 (1856).
5 State v. Main, 69 Conn. 131, 37 Atl. 80 (1897); State v. Means, 95 Me.
364, 50 Atl. 30 (1901); State v. Minneapolis Milk Co., 124 Minn. 34, 144
N. W. 417 (1913); Hamilton v. Pitt. R. R. Co., 190 Pa. 59, 42 At. 369
(1 8 99 )-, State v. Quigley, 26 R. I. 263, 58 AtI. 905 (1904).
'1The Caraway Bill (H. B. 9354), introduced in the House of Representa-
tives in 1918 provided: (a) that a federal judge could not comment on
%veight of evidence, (b) must not express opinion on credibility of witness,
and (c) must give instructions before arguments of attorneys. But see,
Note (1918) 31 HAAv. L. REv. 1011.7 Vicksburg & Elec. By. Co. v. Putnam, supra n. 3.
8North Carolina in 1793 was the first state to adopt such a statute. It
is said that North Carolina passed the law to satisfy the personal desires
of three or four criminal lawyers, who had political influence in the legis-
lature, and who disliked certain circuit judges. See THE LAw or EVIDENCE,
(1927) Yale University Press, pages 9-21. The American spirit of inde-
pendence and fear-of power, no doubt facilitated the statute's adoption in
other states.9 Whitelaw's Ex'r. v. Whitelaw, 83 Va. 40, 1 S. E. 407 (1887).
10State v. Hurst, 11 W. Va. 54 (1877). The court summarizing in the
syllabus said: "It is error for a court in the trial of a criminal cause, to
make a remark to, or in the presence of the jury, in reference to matters
of fact, which might in any degree influence them in their verdict."
As to weight of evidence see Harmon and Crocket v. Maddy Bros. 57 W. Va.
66, 49 S. E. 1009 (1905) ; White v. Sohn, 63 W. Va. 80, 59 S. E. 890 (1907) ;
State v. Long, 88 W. Va. 669, 108 S. E. 279 (1921); State v. Winans, 100
W. Va. 421, 130 S. E. 607 (1925); State v. Waters, 104 W. Va. 217, 139
S. E. 704 (1927); State v. Ison, 104 W. Va. 433, 140 S. E. 139 (1927). As
to credibility of a witness, State v. Ringer, 84 W. Va. 546, 100 S. E. 413
(1919) ; State v. Staley, 45 W. Va. 792, 32 S. E. 198 (1899). But courts
can classify witnesses in respect to weight and value of their testimony in an
instruction to the jury, if the instruction is based on a well defined dis-
tinction as to the opportunity of the witness to know the truth, see State v.
Croston, 103 W. Va. 380, 137 S. E. 536 (1927); Ward v. Brown, 53 W. Va.
227, 44 S. E. 488 (1903).
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WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
automaton to rule on motions and give long instruction which no
juror can understand.' The judge should take an active part in
the conduct of the trial to the end that its course may be directed
by an impartial expert rather than by the conflicting interests
of partisans. It is true the opinion of the judge may on occasion
influence the verdict of the jury. This will not of itself cause a
miscarriage of justice. Cases from the federal reports refute the
charge.' There has been no criticism of undue influence in Penn-
sylvania or Connecticut.' Are not West Virginia judges worthy
of a similar trust?
West Virginia should enact the following statute:
"The trial judge may express to the jury, after the
close of the evidence and arguments, his opinion as to the
weight and credibility of the evidence or any part of it.""
The adoption of this statute would (if the experience of other
state is a guide) speed the examination of jurors, reduce the trial
time and speed verdicts, give the judge a real part in the trial,
and afford the jury valuable aid in clarifying complicated evidence
and complex instructions.' The merits of the old common law
would be revived - there were few dangers - many benefits.
-CHARLES W. CALDWELL.
Some West Virginia trial judges question the witnesses, but without the
expression of opinion.
'3The judge's comment to the jury---"I regard the testimony as con-
vincing," Simmons v. United States, 142 U. S. 148, 12 S. Ct. 171 (1891),
where the court commented: "It (the court) is of the opinion that you
should find for the plaintiff," United States v. Phil. & Reading Ry. Co., 123
U. S. 113, 8 S. Ct. 77 (3887); and where the judge declared that the jury
could find for the plaintiff, but, "If you should do so, I would be much
surprised at your verdict, and would not be surprised if I should set it
aside," Cal. Ins. Co. v. Union Compress Co., 133 U. S. 387, 10 S. Ct. 365
(1899) - did not unduly influence their decision. In no jurisdiction is the
judge permitted to instruct the jury on certain facts; but this is quite
another thing from commenting on the evidence or the witnesses.
'3See THE LAW Or EVIDENCE, supra n. 8, at Appendix A pp. 69-87.
"See THE LAw Or EVIDENCE, supra n. 8, at p. 9.
See THE LAW Or EVIDENCE, sup-ra n. 8, at pp. 20-21.
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